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An aspect of assessment which has received little attention compared with perennial 
concerns, such as standards or reliability, is the role of judgment in marking. This paper 
explores marking as an act of judgment, paying particular attention to the nature of 
judgment and the processes involved. It brings together studies which have explored 
marking from a psychological perspective for the purpose of critical discussion of the 
light they shed on each other and on the practice of marking. Later stages speculate on 
recent developments in psychology and neuroscience which may cast further light on 
educational assessment. 
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Introduction 
Marking is a multi-faceted topic which has been explored from perspectives as 
diverse as the technical requirements of validity and reliability to its use as a 
formative tool to enhance learning. An aspect of marking which has received 
comparatively little attention until recently is the role of judgment. Most assessments 
– with the exception of those adopting a fixed-response format which enables marking 
to be completed by a machine – are underpinned by the judgment of individuals. 
Despite its pivotal role in assessment, the nature of judgment and the processes 
involved are topics which have received scant attention compared with perennial 
concerns such as standards or the reliability of marking. Systematic attempts to 
explore the role of judgment in marking are a recent phenomenon with researchers 
invariably expressing a sense of venturing into little explored terrain – a point which 
has been observed in the context of schoolteacher assessment (Wyatt-Smith and 
Castleton 2005), external examining (Suto and Greatorex 2008) and higher education 
(Elander 2004).  In other disciplines, medicine for instance, research into judgment 
has played a role in the development of theory and the improvement of practice 
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(Chapman 2005)) suggesting that there may be much to gain from closer attention to 
this aspect of marking.  
This paper explores marking as an act of judgment, bringing together studies 
which have explored marking from a psychological perspective for the purpose of 
critical discussion of the light they shed on each other and on the practice of marking. 
Later stages speculate on recent developments in psychology and neuroscience which 
may also elucidate educational assessment. The following section sets the scene by 
considering judgment as a research topic.  
 
Research Context 
Much of the research into judgment has taken place in disciplines other than 
educational assessment: business management, economics, accounting, medicine, 
public policy and governance. Elander (2004, 114) suggests that this „relative lack of 
attention‟ is „perhaps surprising‟ given that assessment is „part of the natural subject 
matter of psychology‟. One consequence of this relative neglect is that: „Within the 
very broad field of psychology there exist multiple constructs of judgement and 
decision-making, which have yet to be applied to examination marking‟ (Suto and 
Greatorex 2008, 214). An overarching concern of extant research is to expound the 
relationship between rational and intuitive thought. The branches of Psychology that 
have been drawn on most frequently to analyse and interpret markers‟ behaviour 
focus on bounded rationality – the shortcuts used to cope with limited time and the 
limited information processing capacity of the human mind – and judgment under 
uncertainty – how judgment is affected when the information available is insufficient 
to provide an adequate basis for judging. Research has focused on: biases, which are 
sometimes viewed as concomitants of heuristics; aspects (or cues) that subjects attend 
to as they mark; the role of memory, especially the working memory; tacit knowledge 
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and the formation of social and individual cognitive constructs. However, researchers 
who have addressed the topic from an educational perspective have sometimes 
adopted a grounded approach, allowing an explanation of findings to emerge from the 
analysis of data with little or no explicit reference to extant theories of judgment (e.g. 
Morgan 1996). Although various theoretical stances have been adopted, the volume of 
research remains comparatively slim. 
The choice of research methods is a particularly important consideration 
because judgment is a tacit process which leaves no trace of its workings under 
normal circumstances. These are but two of the issues which make judgment elusive 
and notoriously difficult to study. The challenge of elucidating processes which are 
normally cloaked by the impenetrability of the individual‟s mind has encouraged the 
use of more innovative and technically sophisticated methods as well as standard 
methods such as interviewing. For instance, judgment analysis is used to capture an 
expert‟s judgment policy by analysing a number of prior judgments to determine the 
different cues (or aspects) which are attended to and how these are weighted and 
combined. This information is used to create a statistical model of the individual‟s 
judgment policy which can be applied to future cases involving similar judgments. 
Elander (2004, 118) notes that this mechanical method can eliminate errors and bias, 
leading to „better decisions than those based on an expert‟s intuitive or holistic 
judgement‟. However, Cooksey, Freebody, and Wyatt-Smith (2007, 428) concluded 
that teacher judgment involves a process that: „is more complex than can be 
represented in psychometric models or in linear judgment models‟, arguing that 
combining judgment analysis with think aloud: „elaborates on a story that neither 
alone can tell in full‟ (429). Indeed, it is widely accepted that a combination of 
methods yields better information than reliance on a single method. For instance, van 
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Someren, Barnard, and Sandberg (1996, 26) recommend that one method may be used 
to „focus or facilitate application of the next‟. Eraut (2000, 120) suggests using „a 
mediating object like a picture or a drawing‟ as a stimulus. A study of the clinical 
knowledge of nurses found that a twin methodology combining interviews with 
knowledge maps and digital photographs within an hour of observed events afforded a 
„unique perspective‟ on clinical expertise (Fessey 2002, 47).  
Think aloud is a commonly used elicitation method. It requires subjects to 
generate concurrent verbal reports of their thoughts whilst they are marking, making it 
a useful tool for eliciting cognitive processes which would otherwise remain tacit. 
Whereas subjects are inclined to manipulate reports that are given retrospectively, a 
strength of concurrent reporting is that: „Because almost all of the subject‟s conscious 
effort is aimed at [the task in hand], there is no room left for reflecting on what he or 
she is doing …He or she renders [thoughts] just as they come to mind‟ (Van Someren, 
Barnard, and Sandberg 1996, 25-26). However, think aloud is not without difficulties. 
For instance, Ericsson (2002) stresses that the instructions and procedures used 
strongly influence the capacity of think aloud to generate faithful verbatim accounts 
of thoughts. He calls for greater methodological rigour and standardisation of 
approaches, along with explicit accounts of these aspects of research. Van Someren, 
Barnard, and Sandberg (1996, 34) also note that experts are inclined to be „secretive‟ 
or „reluctant to give someone else insight in their actual problem-solving behaviour‟, 
behaving „more rationally‟ than they would in natural settings. Furthermore, Leighton 
(2004, 11) has cautioned against treating think aloud as a tool which is equally 
adapted to all situations where one wishes to elicit thought. Difficult tasks tend to 
yield sparse verbal reports because they „take up a lot of mental resources and 
overload working memory‟ leaving „few, if any, working memory resources to 
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actually describe or articulate the process‟. Easy tasks are also ill-adapted to verbal 
reporting because they rely on automatic cognitive processing which „occurs too 
quickly failing to leave a conscious trace in working memory‟ (11). Thus, think aloud 
works best with tasks of „moderate difficulty‟ (11). Finally, influences which operate 
below the cognitive threshold are unlikely to be captured by think aloud as subjects 
will not verbalise that of which they are unaware. Experimental research plays an 
important role in uncovering aspects of judgment which are pre-conscious or which 
occur too rapidly to be perceived (e.g. Laming 2004).  
Overall, the obstacles to elucidating judgment remain considerable. Whilst 
acknowledging that researchers should „reach as far as they can down the continuum 
from explicit to tacit knowledge‟ (Eraut 2000, 119), Eraut urges caution, noting that: 
„the limitations in making tacit knowledge explicit are formidable … There can be 
many benefits from making some progress in this area … Nevertheless researchers 
need to be both inventive and modest with their aspirations‟ (135).  
 
Judgment processes in marking: Are they qualitatively different? 
Keren and Teigen (2004, 93) characterise the psychology of judgment thus: „It may be 
slow and deliberate, like problem-solving, and quick and immediate, like for instance 
distance perception, where we seemingly jump to the conclusion (e.g. “a car is 
approaching”)‟. The relationship between rational and intuitive thought has been an 
important preoccupation for recent assessment research. For instance, Suto and 
Greatorex (2008) used a recent development in the heuristics and biases research 
programme (see section, „The role of heuristics?‟) – the dual processing theory of 
judgment – to explain the behaviour of General Certificate of Secondary Education 
(GCSE) examiners. This theory distinguishes „quick and associative‟ system 1 
judgements from „slow and rule-governed‟ System 2 judgements (Suto and Greatorex 
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2008, 215). Judgments made using System 1 are „intuitive‟, „automatic, effortless, 
skilled actions, comprising opaque thought processes, which occur in parallel and so 
rapidly that they can be difficult to elucidate‟ whereas System 2 judgments involve 
„slow, serial, controlled and effortful rule applications, of which the thinker is self-
aware‟ (215). The two systems are thought to be concurrently active, enabling 
subjects to switch between them according to the cognitive demands of the task in 
hand. Suto and Greatorex (2008) used this theory to interpret the cognitive strategies 
employed by GCSE examiners assessing two subjects chosen for their contrasting 
contents and mark schemes: a points-based mark scheme in mathematics and a 
primarily levels-based scheme in business studies. Six examiners in each subject 
marked scripts from the previous year‟s examinations. Suto and Greatorex combined 
think aloud with semi-structured interviews, identifying five distinct cognitive 
marking strategies. For instance, the „matching‟ strategy required „a simple judgment 
of whether a candidate‟s response matches the mark scheme‟ (220). It was presented 
as system 1 judgment because markers could rely on rapid pattern recognition, 
identifying, for instance, a word, letter or number which matched the mark scheme.  
„Scrutinising‟ (225), in contrast, was used for unexpected responses where a marker 
needed to determine whether an answer was due to error or represented an acceptable 
alternative to the mark scheme. Scrutinising was presented as evidence of system 2 
judgment because it entailed multiple rereads of a text, pauses, hesitations and 
recourse to the mark scheme as markers tried to resolve their uncertainty. Another 
important feature of the dual processing theory is that „complex cognitive operations 
may migrate from System 2 to System 1‟ (215) as individuals gain experience. 
Indeed, some „very experienced examiners‟, who Suto and Greatorex consulted about 
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their findings, raised concerns that some assistant examiners were switching from 
System 2 to System 1 on particular questions „before they were ready to do so‟ (229).  
Ecclestone (2001) is another proponent of the view that the judgments which 
underpin assessment are qualitatively different. Her study entailed some important 
differences from that undertaken by Suto and Greatorex (2008) yet her conclusions 
bear some striking similarities. First, Ecclestone investigated the marking of 
undergraduate dissertations whereas Suto and Greatorex focused on marking at GCSE 
level. Thus, Ecclestone‟s markers assessed longer, more complex responses than 
those judged by the GCSE examiners. The dissertations were completed as part of an 
Education degree whereas Suto and Greatorex used scripts from Mathematics and 
Business Studies examinations. Ecclestone also adopted different research methods: a 
two-year case study during which she acted as a participant observer in annual 
moderation meetings as well as interviewing markers, analysing their written 
feedback and comparing grades awarded. Finally, Ecclestone drew on a different 
theoretical source, Eraut (1996) who, in turn, drew on Dreyfus and Dreyfus‟ model of 
professional decision-making. The resulting model of judgment is more elaborate than 
the dichotomous system proposed by Suto and Greatorex in that it distinguishes four 
categories, each linked to a stage in the development of expertise: novices, advanced 
beginners, competents and experts. Arguably the most important difference between 
these theories is that the model adopted by Ecclestone is expertise-based and follows 
a step-wise approach, with earlier stages being superseded by subsequent stages, 
whereas in dual processing the two systems remain concurrently active, enabling 
assessors to switch between them according to the demands of the task. Ecclestone‟s 
model does not preclude the use by experts of approaches associated with earlier 
stages. On the contrary, this is recommended as a means of countering the „erratic 
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interpretation‟ to which expert judgment is prone (305). However, this is presented as 
problematical because experts are resistant to using approaches associated with 
inexperienced status. Despite the considerable differences between these studies, 
Ecclestone‟s characterisation of expert judgement has much in common with Suto and 
Greatorex‟s account of system 1 judgment. For instance, expert judgment is depicted 
as displaying „a declining dependence on rules, routines and explicit deliberation. 
Experts become more intuitive and less deliberative, and are less able to articulate the 
tacit knowledge on which much of their decision making has come to depend‟ (305). 
Likewise, novices were found to be more reliant on rule-based guidelines making 
novice judgment akin to system 2 judgment. Both studies suggested that the 
accumulation of experience inclined markers to speedier, less considered judgments. 
The points on which these theories concur may elucidate findings reported 
elsewhere which might otherwise appear baffling. For instance, an American study 
compared the scores awarded by five middle school mathematics teachers, who had 
been trained to use a rubric for marking non-traditional mathematical tasks, with the 
scores given by an expert group composed of mathematics education researchers who 
used the same rubric (Meier, Rich, and Cady 2006). The results indicated that four of 
the five teachers experienced difficulty when required to give equal consideration to 
two separate criteria (the correctness of procedures and fullness of explanations), 
focusing on one at the expense of the other. When the task was less complex (i.e. only 
one criterion was involved), „teachers were better able to judge the student responses 
using the rubric‟ (91). However, they experienced greatest difficulty in giving equal 
weight to two separate criteria when the mathematical task involved familiar content. 
When the content was unfamiliar, the level of difficulty was reduced. On the face of 
it, this is counter-intuitive. One would expect unfamiliar content to compound the 
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level of difficulty by increasing the cognitive load, yet the opposite appeared to be 
true.  Meier, Rich, and Cady speculate that: „perhaps … when the content is 
unfamiliar the teachers must think more about the task, and the processes and 
explanations themselves, making both important. The familiar tasks do not require the 
teachers to think about the reasoning: thus, they do not look carefully at the 
explanations‟ (90-91).  This proposition articulates with the theories outlined above, 
suggesting that an element of unfamiliarity in the content may have obliged these 
markers to make qualitatively different judgments, behaving less like „experts‟, 
making „system 1‟ judgments, and more like „novices‟ using „system 2‟ thought 
processes. This led to improved construct representation (correctness of procedures 
and fullness of explanations) enhancing the construct validity of the assessment. 
It is important to note that this is contested territory and that the theory of 
qualitatively different judgments is not universally accepted within the discipline of 
Psychology. An alternative view holds that „so-called System 2 judgment is actually a 
collection of closely linked System 1-type judgements, occurring both in parallel and 
in series … From this perspective, the evaluating strategy would comprise multiple 
rapidly occurring judgements, of which only the combined results are being 
verbalised‟ (Suto and Greatorex 2008, 224-225).  If this stance is accepted, it also 
casts doubt upon the notion that judges pass through stages, moving from a slower, 
more controlled type of judgement to a more rapid and intuitive mode as they acquire 
expertise. Alternatively, it can be argued that confidence in the claim that there are 
qualitative differences in the nature of the judgments underpinning assessment is 
increased by the fact that different studies, involving a variety of contexts and 
assessment tasks, have yielded similar characterisations of the underlying judgment 
processes. Another alternative, which emerges later in this paper, is that an either/or 
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stance simplifies what is, almost always, a complex amalgam combining elements of 
rational and intuitive thought. 
 
Comparators for judgment: Published criteria 
Judgment does not take place in a vacuum; it requires some form of comparator. In 
assessment, these comparators are known as „referents‟ and a number of these are in 
common use: criteria, constructs, self (or ipsative assessment) and norms (Wiliam 
1992, 17). The theory that there is a type of judgment which is algorithmic and 
deliberative is compatible with an approach to assessment which uses published 
criteria as referents. Published criteria are widely regarded as one of the principal 
means of enhancing the transparency, consistency and fairness of assessment and 
there is an extensive literature critiquing their capacity to deliver these goals (e.g. 
Jonsson and Svingby 2007; Price and Rust 1999). However, an international survey 
found that even within a single sector, higher education, „there is no common 
understanding of what criteria-based means or what it implies for practice … 
Additionally, the concepts of “criteria” and “standards” are often confused‟ (Sadler 
2005, 175).This paper adopts Sadler‟s definition of a criterion as „A distinguishing 
property or characteristic of any thing, by which its quality can be judged or 
estimated, or by which a decision or classification can be made … Criteria are 
attributes or rules that are useful as levers for making judgments‟ (178-79).   
Across educational sectors, it is regarded as good practice for qualifications to 
publish the criteria they use to assess performance. The criteria, therefore, are pre-
determined, often by a panel of experts convened expressly for the purpose. 
Familiarisation with the criteria becomes a prerequisite for judgment and markers 
may be required to undergo a period of training during which the meaning of the 
criteria, and how to apply them, is clarified. Thereafter, they remain central to 
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assessment, acting as a touchstone for judgment. Yet questions remain about the 
extent to which this approach articulates with ways in which judgments are actually 
enacted. For instance, this approach does not fit well with the theory of system 1 
judgment nor the theory that experts are inclined to judge in ways which are intuitive 
and increasingly independent of rules and routines. There is, however, a better fit with 
theories of novice and system 2 judgments which involve rule application. Empirical 
research provides evidence supporting the claim that published criteria are important 
in the induction of novice assessors (Ecclestone 2001; Wolf 1995). It also confirms 
that experienced assessors are less likely to judge in the way that assessment criteria 
require. Wolf (1995, 71), for instance, describes a UK study of vocational assessment 
involving invoice completion. Industry informants had „insisted that the criterion for 
competent performance was 100 per cent accuracy: mistakes might be tolerated in 
school but not in the workplace‟. Yet when: „Asked to assess the invoices against the 
relevant standards, the experienced and inexperienced behaved totally differently. The 
inexperienced failed everyone because everyone had failed to meet the criterion: the 
experienced judged many competent (as had their own workplace supervisors)‟ (71). 
Wolf explains this contradictory state of affairs thus: „All the research evidence that 
we have on assessors‟ behaviour emphasizes the very active role that their own 
concepts and interpretations play … Assessors do not simply “match” candidates‟ 
behaviour to assessment instructions in a mechanistic fashion‟ (67-68).  
Similar conclusions were reached by Hay and Macdonald (2008) who used 
semi-structured interviews and participant observation over a twenty week period to 
explore the way in which two Australian teachers, responsible for school-based 
assessment of PE, used the criteria and standards published in the official PE syllabus. 
Both teachers were found to assess intuitively, relying on their memories of how 
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pupils had performed during the course and consulting the official criteria 
retrospectively to seek confirmation of judgments that had already been made [„“I 
think that most of us make our judgements first and then we look at the criteria sheet 
and see if it backs us up”‟ one teacher observed (160)]. The teachers justified their 
approach by claiming that they had already internalised the official criteria and 
standards. However, Hay and Macdonald contend that this process of internalisation 
resulted in „a new set of criteria and standards that bear some semblance to the official 
set outlined in the syllabus‟ (165) but that these were combined with teachers‟ 
idiosyncratic values, beliefs and expectations about performance. One teacher, for 
instance, valued being „switched on‟ and enthusiastic, being prepared to contribute to 
lessons and ask questions. The other assessed his students by taking them on in a 
game [„“I do my best and I expect them to meet the challenge”‟ (161)]. For this 
teacher, valued dispositions included a readiness to take him on, a drive to win and 
aggression in play. Thus, each set of internalised criteria developed by a teacher 
incorporated „construct-irrelevant affective characteristics of students‟ (153) that were 
absent from the official criteria. Hay and Macdonald concluded that this construct 
irrelevance „compromised the construct validity and possible inter-rater reliability of 
the decisions made and advantaged some students and marginalised others on the 
basis of characteristics that were not specifically related to the learning expected from 
following the syllabus‟ (153). 
 
Comparators for judgment: individual and social constructs 
There is other evidence which questions the use of published criteria as assessment 
referents. For instance, the finding that communities of markers are capable of 
developing „a general construct of “level” or “ability” … without access to any stated 
criteria‟ (Morgan 1996, 356) would be puzzling if explicit criteria were a necessary 
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component of a referencing system. Likewise, it would be hard to explain the 
paradoxical finding that assessors working on modules with tightly defined 
specifications arrived at very different results yet „apparently very vague and 
“woolly” communication modules … turned out to be highly consistent across the 
group of colleges studied‟ (Wolf 1995, 77). Findings such as these raise questions 
about the role of published criteria in the processes of (i) forming judgments (ii) 
achieving and maintaining consistency between markers. Wiliam (1996) contends that 
the ability of markers to agree in the absence of criteria is because a different process 
is at work – construct-referencing – claiming that  „most sophisticated assessments 
that take place in the real world are of this kind‟ (Wilam 1992, 19). Jackson (2002, 3) 
describes constructs as „people‟s constructions of important entities in their 
psychological world‟. Amongst the „important entities‟ in the „psychological world‟ 
of markers of graded assessments are constructs of the nature of performance which 
typifies different grades – a phenomenon alluded to by Ecclestone‟s (2001) title, „I 
know a 2:1 when I see it‟. It entails recognising the standards embodied in individual 
performances. Indeed, Wiliam (1992, 19) has cautioned against succumbing to the 
pressure to criterion-reference all assessments, especially complex skills and 
performances which are irreducible and cannot be itemised because „the whole is 
greater than the sum of parts‟.  
Empirical evidence supporting this assertion comes from a number of studies 
involving complex, holistic assessments, although it is often anecdotal. For instance, 
Wiliam (1996, 297) notes that teachers involved in a GCSE English qualification 
assessed entirely by coursework „quite quickly internalized notions of “levelness”, so 
that in the vast majority of cases different teachers would agree that a particular 
portfolio of work merited, say, a D. This was even though the teachers had no explicit 
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criteria and did not agree on what aspects of the work were most significant in making 
the award‟. Further evidence appears in an account of the introduction of a new GCSE 
English syllabus, devised to reflect changes in the National Curriculum for England 
and Wales. The previous syllabus had supported construct-referenced assessment, 
allowing teachers to think in terms of grades, which were subsequently converted into 
marks. However, the new syllabus, „was by far the most exacting in the way it 
demanded certain criteria should be met‟ (Marshall 2000, 162), thereby altering the 
way in which judgments were to be made. Marshall recounts an incident at a 
consortium meeting which illustrates the dilemma this new syllabus had occasioned. 
Discussion focused on a script which, according to the convenor, „“screams D”‟. 
However, the script did not meet all of the new criteria for a D. The convenor, who 
was there to „guide teachers through the whole process‟ of implementing the new 
syllabus, urged them not to: „“get bogged down in looking at the assessment criteria”‟ 
(163) thereby favouring the established construct-referenced approach over the new 
criterion-referenced system. The incident illustrates the destabilising effect of 
undermining established constructs, throwing into doubt teachers‟ confidence in their 
own judgment. As one examiner remarked: „“I had an understanding of what a D was. 
I‟ve marked scripts. But I simply don‟t see it …”‟ (164).    
Whilst personal constructs enable individuals to make sense of their world, 
there is also evidence that where there are opportunities to collaborate, the 
development of constructs can become a shared undertaking, emerging within a 
community of practice (Wenger 1998). This appears to underlie Wolf‟s (1995) 
seemingly contradictory finding that assessors working with tightly defined 
specifications were highly inconsistent whereas those marking vague communication 
modules achieved high levels of agreement. The explanation of this seeming paradox 
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was that tutors on the communication courses, concerned by „their own uncertainty 
about how to interpret the criteria … had formed a close network to share ideas and 
interpretations and so developed common understandings‟ (77). The value of 
communities of practice for developing shared constructs and enhancing consistency 
of assessment is a recurring theme in assessment literature. For instance, Wilmut, 
Wood, and Murphy (1996, 20) noted that „greater consistency of marking can be 
achieved when markers work in teams (a “conference” setting) than when they mark 
singly, even when monitored‟. They also noted how the reliability of National 
Vocational Qualification assessment was enhanced by „internal verification meetings 
with assessors‟ because these meetings promoted „more consistent assessment 
practices across assessors, particularly when focused on the interpretation of standards 
and the sufficiency of evidence‟ (11). This message has emerged across educational 
sectors: in vocational assessment, in higher education and in the schools sector where 
it has been observed that: „the constructs of “level” of secondary and of primary 
teachers … are determined more by group membership than by any “objective” 
meaning that might be attached to the criteria‟ (Morgan 1996, 356). This is because, 
despite the „“objective” appearance of the use of an assessment scheme based on 
either generic criteria or task-specific performance indicators, the practical 
implementation of the scheme relies on the existence of socially constructed 
consensus among the assessors about their application‟ (356). Despite their widely 
reported benefits, studies from across educational sectors suggest that the time 
required to develop and sustain assessment communities makes them vulnerable to 
competition for resources from new initiatives. The influx of new initiatives may 
divert energies, previously devoted to assessment, causing established communities to 
atrophy (Garry, McCool, and O‟Neill 2005; Hall and Harding 2002).  
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Judgment under uncertainty: The role of biases 
Laming (2004) draws on numerous laboratory experiments to evince the claim that a 
key feature of judgment under uncertainty is its susceptibility to extraneous influences 
– in other words, the tendency to become biased. Evans (1993, 16) describes bias as 
„systematic attention to some logically irrelevant features of the task, or systematic 
neglect of a relevant feature‟. Laming argues that bias is „irresistible‟ (153) because it 
is pre-conscious, coming into operation whenever the available evidence is 
insufficient to support judgment: „To the extent that judgment is uncertain, past 
experience enters like air rushing in to fill a vacuum‟ (164). He argues that it is 
because we all have „different accumulations of past experience‟ that we tend to 
„make different judgments about the same issue‟ (18).  
This theory may help to explain various aspects of marking including the 
variable levels of inter-rater reliability reported in marking experiments. Some 
assessments may be viewed as having a substantial element of uncertainty built into 
them either because of the methods used (e.g. essays marked using qualitative criteria) 
and/or because of the inherent nature of the subject (e.g. subjects which prioritise 
creativity or a personal response such as Art or English). Other assessments may be 
viewed as less uncertain either because of the methods used (e.g. short, structured 
items marked using a points-based mark scheme) and/or because of the inherent 
nature of the subject (e.g. subjects which prioritise mastery of a body of knowledge 
such as Science). An investigation by Murphy (1978) into the reliability of eight 
subjects at General Certificate of Education Ordinary and Advanced Level (O-Level 
and A-Level) is relevant here. The study identified three main influences on 
reliability: subject area; question type and the number of parts that contributed to a 
final mark. In connection with subject area, Murphy found that although all of the 
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examinations contained large proportions of essay questions, the English papers 
produced the poorest reliability scores. One of the A-level Literature papers and the 
essay paper in the English Language O-Level yielded levels of reliability markedly 
lower than those produced by any of the other thirteen papers used in the 
investigation. The effect of question type was found to be most pronounced in an 
examination employing exclusively essay-type items. If the findings related to 
judgment under uncertainty apply to marking in the same way that they have been 
used to explain other types of decision-making behaviour, they may suggest that the 
more sources of uncertainty there are in an assessment, the more susceptible to bias 
that assessment is likely to become, thereby increasing the threats to inter-rater 
reliability. 
Lower levels of inter-rater reliability have indeed been found in examinations 
where there is a substantial element of uncertainty inherent in the subject and/or 
assessment method (Newton 1996; Wilmut, Wood, and Murphy 1996). Moreover, a 
wide range of biases has been detected in educational assessment. The range is too 
extensive to enumerate here so what follows is intended as an illustration rather than a 
comprehensive account. First, there is evidence that knowing a student whose work is 
being assessed allows a range of personal considerations to influence assessment. 
Students‟ work habits, social behaviour, gender, ethnicity, cultural background and 
physical attractiveness are amongst the factors which have been found to bias the 
assessment of academic performance when students are known by their assessors (e.g. 
Dennis, Newstead, and Wright 1996; Gipps and Murphy 1994; Harlen 2005; Meier, 
Rich, and Cady 2006; Pollitt and Murray 1996). It has also been shown that markers 
are susceptible to the „halo effect‟ of finding what they are predisposed to find based 
on prior knowledge of a student (Harlen 2004). Dennis, Newstead, and Wright (1996, 
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516) suggest that this is consistent with psychological theories of impression 
formation: „individuals tend to form consistent impressions of others at an early stage 
in the impression formation process … and having done this are prone to discount 
evidence which is inconsistent with those early views‟. In assessment research, 
impressions have been shown to form on the basis of brief encounters (Pollitt and 
Murray 1996).  
Personal knowledge is not the only source of bias. In situations where students 
are unknown, such as external examinations, Dennis, Newstead, and Wright (1996) 
suggest that group stereotypes are a more likely source of bias – for instance, if social 
group can be deduced from a candidate‟s name or that of their examination centre. 
When written performance is assessed, surface features including the neatness and 
legibility of handwriting and the font size used to word process assignments have 
been identified as sources of bias (Vaughan 1992; Milanovic, Saville, and Shuhong 
1996; Hartley et al. 2006).  
Although many studies have focused on the detection of biases, fewer have 
investigated their operation. A three-year Australian study is pertinent here. Wyatt-
Smith and Castleton (2005) used think aloud to investigate how teachers judged the 
written English of ten-year-olds in three different contexts: in-context judgments 
involved assessing work by their own students; out-of-context judgments involved 
marking work samples by unknown ten-year-olds and system context judgments 
involved re-assessing the anonymous samples against Australian literacy benchmarks. 
They identified a set of „indexes‟ which were used to make in-context judgments, 
showing how difficult judgment became when a shift to out-of-context assessment 
rendered certain indexes unavailable. Although these indexes were not presented as 
biases, the infrequency with which reference was made to official documents and the 
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national benchmarks was noted. Moreover, some of the indexes may be regarded as 
consistent with the definition of biases given above, for instance, „assumed or actual 
knowledge of the community context in which the school is located‟ (136). Wyatt-
Smith and Castleton found a complex and fluid situation where indexes formed 
unstable, interactive networks. Thus, the weight attributed to different indexes, and 
how they were combined, varied „not only from teacher-to-teacher but also from 
judgement-to-judgement‟ (144). They concluded that: „There is no simple, linear 
course that teachers follow to arrive at their judgements. On the contrary, what 
emerges is a picture of how dynamically networked indexes come into (and out of) 
play in acts of judgement‟ (135). These conclusions are consistent with findings from 
research using judgment analysis. For instance, Elander and Hardman (2002, 318) 
reported that „judgment policies varied from marker to marker‟ amongst the seven 
university lecturers in their study whilst Cooksey, Freebody and Wyatt-Smith (2007) 
identified forty different judgment models operating amongst twenty primary school 
teachers.  
 
The role of heuristics? 
Biases are viewed as „markers or signatures‟ for „underlying heuristics‟ (Gilovich and 
Griffin 2002, 3) by psychologists in the heuristics and biases research tradition. 
Gilovich and Griffin describe heuristics as „highly efficient mental shortcuts‟ (4) 
which offer simpler and quicker ways of judging than the extensive algorithmic 
processing that is characteristic of rational thought. They claim that heuristics not 
only reduce cognitive complexity to dimensions which are more commensurate with 
the limited capacity of human judgment but that they represent a more natural mode 
of thought than the application of reason. A range of general purpose and specialised 
heuristics has been identified, each accompanied by associated biases. Although the 
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detection of biases has been a preoccupation of assessment research, there has been 
little work exploring the potential of heuristics as underlying, explanatory factors.  
One study which used heuristics to explain the biases evident in markers‟ 
behaviour was designed to test the hypothesis that the difference between a first 
marker‟s grades and a moderator‟s grades would be less than that between two „blind‟ 
markers‟ grades (Garry, McCool, and O‟Neill 2005). The biasing effect of knowing a 
previous assessor‟s marks has been known about for many years (e.g. Murphy 1979). 
Garry, McCool, and O‟Neill illustrated its operation in a higher education setting, 
using twenty two Politics lecturers to undertake double blind marking of eleven 
undergraduate examination answers. A second phase of the study entailed the re-
distribution of marked scripts amongst participating lecturers who then moderated the 
initial marking. As predicted, the differences between marks awarded blind were 
„much greater in size‟ (194). However, the distinctive contribution of Garry, McCool, 
and O‟Neill entailed using the anchoring and adjustment heuristic to explain this 
observation. This heuristic draws on the finding that people sometimes reduce 
uncertainty by starting with an „anchor‟ or „beginning reference point‟ (191) which is 
adjusted to reach a final conclusion. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic has been 
observed in various settings, mock jury trials for instance. Thus, when half the jurors 
in a mock jury trial were instructed by the judge to start their deliberations by 
considering the harshest verdict possible whilst the other half were instructed to start 
by considering the most lenient sentence possible, the first jury delivered a much 
harsher verdict than the second. This is consistent with the theory that the judge‟s 
instructions had acted as an anchor which was adjusted to reach a final verdict.  
Garry, McCool, and O‟Neill offer a similar explanation of their finding that greater 
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discrepancies arose when marking was conducted double blind than when first 
marking was moderated.  
The extent to which markers use heuristics, which heuristics are prevalent or 
whether there are any special purpose assessment heuristics, are topics which have 
been little explored. Therefore, what follows is necessarily speculative. It suggests 
that heuristics could provide plausible explanations for various behaviours that have 
been observed during studies of marking. For instance, a key feature of heuristics is 
that they make cognitive tasks more manageable by reducing complexity. One area 
where this may have relevance is in explaining markers‟ use of published assessment 
criteria. Markers have repeatedly been found to reduce and/or simplify criteria, a 
practice which impacts on the construct validity of an assessment. For instance, 
Bridges, Elliott, and McKee (1995, 6) reported that teacher educators who attempted 
to apply the criteria devised by the Department for Education to assess student 
teachers experienced difficulty in applying the full range: „In practice we found that 
teacher educators tended to reduce the lists of competences specified by the 
Department for Education to not more than six broad categories‟. Likewise, although 
the nine tutors in Vaughan‟s study completed their marking using eight assessment 
criteria, five different reading strategies were identified. Two were characterised by a 
„single-focus‟, whilst a third was described as „the “two-category” strategy‟ and the 
fourth as „the “first impression dominates”‟ (Vaughan 1992, 118). Further evidence 
appears in a study of Key Stage 3 National Curriculum assessment in English which 
reported that: „markers failed to make distinctions between the mechanics of writing 
and the candidates‟ capacity to demonstrate understanding and write expressively; 
they generally failed to reward the latter‟ (Wilmut, Wood, and Murphy 1996, 20). 
Wood (in Wilmut, Wood, and Murphy 1996, 20) also found that markers were „“quite 
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unable to distinguish (at least when marking) between different features of writing”‟. 
Findings such as these are consistent with Tversky and Kahneman‟s (2002, 20) claim 
that: „One of the manifestations of a heuristic is the relative neglect of other 
considerations‟.  
 
Working memory and heuristics 
Investigations into the functioning of the working memory (e.g. Baddeley 1998) are 
also pertinent here. Grimley, Dahraei, and Riding (2008, 214) define working 
memory as „the temporary storage of information that is necessary for performing 
cognitive tasks‟, emphasising that: „A practical feature of working memory is its 
limited capacity and the vulnerability to loss of information in it from displacement 
by further incoming information‟. A study by Scharaschkin and Baird illustrates how 
working memory shortages have been used to explain judgment in assessment. 
Scharaschkin and Baird (2000, 343) investigated the role of expert judgment by 
examiners in the setting of A-Level standards in Biology and Sociology, focusing on 
the puzzling observation that „there is not a one-to-one correspondence between 
marks and grades‟. In other words, examiners may consider two scripts to be worthy 
of the same overall mark but of different grades. They investigated three conditions – 
consistent, average and inconsistent performance – based on the range of marks 
awarded to a script and focusing on the A/B and E/N grade borderlines in each 
subject. Participants were asked to award each script a grade and to rate their 
difficulty in awarding a grade on a five-point scale. The pattern of results differed in 
each subject. In Biology, inconsistent performance produced lower judgments of 
grade-worthiness than average or consistent performance whereas in Sociology there 
was a preference for very consistent performance. Overall, consistency of 
performance emerged as a statistically significant factor in judgments about grade 
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worthiness. Scharaschkin and Baird attributed their findings to the difficulty of 
multivariate decision-making tasks which require the integration of many different 
pieces of information, pointing to research which found that people could not hold 
two distinct dimensions in mind. They argued that „Lack of consistency of 
performance probably affects judgements because it forces examiners to integrate 
contradictory information about a candidate‟s performance‟ (354). Therefore, because 
„people are poor at holding different states of the world in mind due to working 
memory constraints … It is likely that examiners‟ grading judgements are erroneously 
affected by consistency of performance‟ (354).  
Although Scharaschkin and Baird did not include heuristics and biases in their 
interpretation, they may offer a perspective on this phenomenon. According to the 
definition of a bias given above, these A-Level examiners were making biased 
judgments because consistency „was not part of the marking scheme‟ (343). Indeed, 
Scharaschkin and Baird argued that „Examiners would probably not wish consistency 
of performance to be taken into account in a marking scheme‟ (354). It is possible, 
therefore, that this bias was the „marker‟ or „signature‟ for an underlying heuristic. 
Representativeness is a general purpose heuristics which is based on mental models, 
such as prototypes, and provides an assessment of the degree of correspondence 
between, for instance, a sample and its parent population or an instance and a category 
(Tversky and Kahneman 2002). Although the pattern of results differed in Sociology 
and Biology, the representativeness heuristic may help to explain why consistent 
performance was a statistically significant factor in judgments of grade-worthiness 
and why inconsistent scripts were always rated as the most difficult to grade. 
Heuristics may help to explain another comparator that markers have been 
found to use: recently marked work. For instance, an enquiry which used think aloud 
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to investigate the marking of experienced Advanced Subsidiary and A-Level 
Geography examiners found that „comparing the quality of a candidate‟s work with 
their previous responses or with another candidate‟s work occurred at least once per 
script on average‟ (Crisp 2008, 256). Similar findings were reported by Vaughan 
(1992) who noted that seven of the nine markers in her study judged in this way. 
Milanovic, Saville and Shuhong (1996, 106) also observed that some markers 
appeared to judge the level of compositions by comparing „to the previous one 
marked‟. It would be misleading to describe this process as norm-referencing as the 
terms of reference are too narrow and too immediate (i.e. the candidate‟s own 
previous answers or those of other recently assessed individuals) for norm-referencing 
which is based on group norms within the wider population. Even the term cohort-
referenced may be too wide-ranging to describe the process. The availability heuristic 
may provide a more meaningful explanation. Availability is a general purpose 
heuristics and refers to „cognitive availability‟, for instance, the ease with which a 
particular outcome can be pictured (Sherman et al. 2002, 98) or the ease with which 
instances or associations are called to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002). Laming 
(2004, 9) also observed that: „All judgments are comparisons of one thing with 
another … the judgment depends on what comparator is available‟. Because markers 
typically assess batches of answers rather than single items, they mark under 
conditions which favour deployment of the availability heuristic.  
 
A role for affect? 
A final aspect of marking which may be illuminated by a study of the mind is the role 
of emotion. The official discourse of professional bodies espouses an image of 
assessment as an impersonal activity, unclouded by emotion (e.g. Quality Assurance 
Agency for Higher Education [QAA] 2006). However, markers‟ verbal reports 
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frequently attest to the range and strength of emotional response that is triggered by 
the act of marking. It is easy to see how feelings formed during previous encounters 
could colour a teacher‟s assessment of known students. It is, therefore, more revealing 
to find that emotion remains salient even when marking takes place under 
experimental conditions where awarding or withholding marks will have no 
consequences for „students‟. Experimental markers have been found to respond 
positively when they are able to award marks and negatively when obliged to 
withhold them. „“Whoopee!”‟ exclaimed one on finding that an answer was correct; 
„“Lovely”‟, remarked another (Suto and Greatorex 2008, 222 and 220). There is 
palpable relief in another marker‟s exclamation: „“Phew, that seems to be OK”‟, on 
discovering that a candidate had included mark-gaining details (Morgan 1996, 363). 
These exclamations suggest a desire to award marks, a desire which is also apparent 
in remarks like: „“I‟m hoping for forty-seven”‟ and „“Would like to give it something 
but … Pity … it‟s not in the mark scheme so reluctantly zero”‟ (Suto and Greatorex 
2008, 220 and 225). Morgan‟s (1996, 361) markers exhibited „discomfort‟ when they 
were obliged to judge harshly, adopting various coping strategies. For instance, they 
„shift the blame to an anonymous authority that lays down what “they have to do”‟. 
When the outcome was uncertain, some markers erred on the side of generosity: 
„“…he hasn‟t justified it as he‟s gone along … I probably would give him a 7 though, 
all the same … OK that‟s a gut reaction level 7, maybe a bit generous”‟ (Morgan 
1996, 365).  
Morgan (1996, 362) argues that the tensions apparent in some of these 
comments are explained by the conflicting „positions‟ adopted by teachers acting as 
examiners. Her study entailed the use of think aloud and interviews to investigate the 
marking of GCSE coursework by eleven secondary school mathematics teachers. 
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Seven different „positions‟ were identified with markers shifting between them as 
they struggled to manage these tensions. For instance, an unclear answer forced two 
teachers to choose between the „teacher/advocate‟ and the „examiner‟ position. The 
„teacher/advocate‟ position was based on the wish that „a pupil should get as high a 
grade as possible‟ and entailed „looking for opportunities to give credit‟ (361) whilst 
the „examiner‟ position entailed the dispassionate application of criteria and a clinical 
detachment from the author of the work. Although both teachers identified the same 
features of the answer as significant (the absence of description and explanation), one 
adopted the teacher/advocate position, arguing that the necessary explanation had 
probably taken place in the classroom – even though there is no suggestion of this in 
the text. The other considered the possibility of taking this position but rejected it in 
favour of the examiner role arguing that the teacher position is only acceptable „“if 
you‟re the teacher in the class”‟ (361). The different positions led them to „opposite 
rankings‟ of the script. Thus, the „teacher/advocate‟ ranked it highest whilst the 
„examiner‟ „ranked it lowest of the three texts they read‟ (366). Clearly, the positions 
assumed had considerable consequences for how markers resolved uncertainties about 
grading. 
Other aspects of marking that act as emotional triggers include the content of 
answers. Thus, one examiner observed: „“I am always favourably inclined to a 
candidate who can interest, surprise, inform or … amuse me”‟ whilst another admitted 
to marking a script down as „“trivial – maybe because I know and love the 
Impressionists”‟ (Milanovic, Saville, and Shuhong 1996, 104 and 105). Surface 
features of performance, including the neatness of presentation and legibility of 
handwriting, also provoked a response. „“Ugh, yuk. What a mess … looking at a 
whole load of percentages, all over the place”‟, exclaimed one marker (Suto and 
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Greatorex 2008, 225). Poor handwriting was a „marked irritation‟ to markers in 
Vaughan‟s study (1992, 114) whilst two thirds of Milanovic, Saville, and Shuhong‟s 
(1996, 103) markers „seemed to be affected to varying degrees by the handwriting‟ 
with one reporting that „“Large, clear writing cheered me up”‟.  
Markers have also been observed reaching out to the author behind an answer, 
striving to read the student in their work. This suggests that as well as an emotional 
aspect to assessment, there is an interpersonal dimension. Again, this has been 
witnessed in experimental as well as in operational settings. For instance, Morgan 
(1996, 367) noted how one experimental marker treated a candidate: „as an individual 
with an existence outside the text. Although the text was the only evidence available 
to her‟. Thus, she speculated „about what might have happened in the class or what 
Richard might have done if he had been advised differently‟. Similarly, Wyatt-Smith 
and Castleton (2005, 146) found that teachers marking anonymous work samples 
persisted in „trying to read the student in the writing‟, searching, for instance, for 
traces of gender in the writing.  
Recent research in psychology and neuroscience reinforces the testimony of 
markers, suggesting that these social and affective dimensions play a more 
fundamental role in judgment than has traditionally been acknowledged, either by 
research (Hardman 2009, 184) or in the official discourse on assessment as conducted 
by professional and awarding bodies. Neuroscientists have challenged the received 
wisdom that judgment is necessarily compromised by emotion by showing how 
difficult judgment is for individuals who are unable to use prior emotional learning to 
guide their decision-making. Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007, 3) argue that: 
„Modern biology reveals humans to be fundamentally emotional and social creatures 
… It is not that emotions rule our cognition, nor that rational thought does not exist‟. 
 28 
Instead, they argue that emotions „are profoundly intertwined with thought‟ (4). Thus, 
although „rational thought and logical reasoning do exist‟, they are „hardly ever truly 
devoid of emotion‟ (7-8). Psychologists in the heuristics and biases tradition have 
reached similar conclusions. A recently proposed heuristics, the affect heuristic, 
„describes the importance of affect in guiding judgments‟ (Slovic et al. 2002, 397). Its 
proponents argue for the primacy of affect, claiming that „affective reactions to 
stimuli are very often the first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently 
guiding information processing and judgment‟ (398). Whilst this claim to primacy is 
not universally accepted (e.g. Rottenstreich and Shu 2004), recent research in 
different disciplines concurs that emotion plays a more complicated and organic role 
in judgment than has generally been acknowledged. 
 
Conclusion 
Marking is a subject of concern across educational sectors. A recent QAA report 
(2009, 3) noted that its own audit and review reports: „typically make more 
recommendations linked to assessment than to any other area‟. The programme of 
work announced at the inauguration of Ofqual illustrates how concerns have extended 
into the public domain (Tattersall 2008, 9). Thus, Ofqual is undertaking work on the 
reliability of tests, examinations and teacher assessment, a principal aim of which is to 
allay public concerns by enhancing understanding of the levels of reliability it is 
realistic to expect. Matters of concern include the extent to which award standards are 
being maintained – a concern fuelled by suggestions of „grade inflation‟ in GCSE, A-
Level and degree awards – and apparent inaccuracies in the application of mark 
schemes. Most of these wider concerns can be traced directly to the microcosmic level 
– to judgments made by individuals about specific performances. Thus, it is the 
contention of this paper that as long as attention is focused on the outward 
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manifestations of marking, but with insufficient attention to the judgment processes 
underpinning them, a fundamental component of these difficulties is being 
overlooked.  
The growing corpus of knowledge on marker judgment could make a 
substantial contribution to the discourse on marking, informing debate and elucidating 
policy and practice. Whilst the practical implications of the findings discussed above 
require a separate paper, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge that they do raise 
questions about established practices. For instance, the application of criteria-based 
assessment is questioned by a number of the studies cited above. Indeed, many 
aspects of policy and practice may benefit from review in the light of what is known 
about judgment. Moreover, this research not only raises questions about existing 
practice; it may also hold the key to improvements. Various studies have led to 
advances in practice (e.g. Szpara and Wylie 2005; Suto and Greatorex 2008). Yet the 
fact remains that only a fraction of the insights that have been yielded by a study of 
the workings of the mind have been applied to educational assessment. Thus, securing 
a better understanding of the role of judgment in marking remains the immediate 
priority and a necessary precursor to the improvement of practice. 
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